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The Hacker News10 Nov 2026 · 2 min read

Wiz Reports Abuse of Qubole AWS Access Roles in Customer Cloud Environments

Cloud security firm Wiz reported that attackers accessed multiple AWS customer environments by abusing credentials associated with Qubole, a data-lake platform owned by Idera. The activity reportedly...

Cloud security firm Wiz reported that attackers accessed multiple AWS customer environments by abusing credentials associated with Qubole, a data-lake platform owned by Idera. The activity reportedly occurred between October 14 and October 26, with the intruders using Qubole’s AWS account to assume customer-created IAM roles and access cloud resources.

Customers commonly configure IAM roles that allow a vendor’s AWS account to use AssumeRole permissions. In the incidents reviewed by Wiz, the affected roles trusted Qubole’s AWS account and accepted a required External ID value. Wiz said the attackers possessed valid credentials for the vendor account, though the source of those credentials has not been disclosed.

Secrets and S3 data targeted

According to the researchers, the actors searched for credentials in AWS Lambda environment variables, AWS Secrets Manager and Systems Manager Parameter Store. They also used TruffleHog to validate recovered secrets, including AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID application secrets and Okta client credentials.

The attackers reportedly copied data from Amazon S3 buckets available to the assumed roles. Wiz said the activity appeared broad rather than focused on particular datasets, with some sessions downloading all accessible content from a bucket. The company noted that incomplete logging in some customer environments limited the ability to determine exactly which S3 objects were accessed.

A separate series of incidents from October 8 through October 11 involved customers’ AWS access keys believed to have been configured for Qubole integrations. Wiz said it had not linked that activity to the role-assumption campaign.

Organizations that have connected Qubole to AWS, including those no longer actively using the service, should review CloudTrail records from October 1 onward. Wiz highlighted unexpected AssumeRole events involving Qubole account ID 805246085872, particularly requests originating outside AWS infrastructure.

  • Remove unneeded Qubole IAM roles or delete the vendor account from their trust policies.
  • Rotate secrets, parameters and Lambda environment variables reachable through potentially compromised roles, and revoke active sessions.
  • Review role permissions for excessive access to S3, Secrets Manager, SSM and Lambda resources.
  • Apply source IP or VPC endpoint restrictions where supported, using documented vendor network ranges.
  • Enable organization-wide CloudTrail coverage and S3 data events or server access logging for sensitive buckets.

Wiz emphasized that External IDs should not be treated as secret values because they can be visible in logs and configuration materials. Qubole and Idera had not publicly commented at the time of the report.

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